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Schneider: Federal Control Over Wetland Areas: The Corps of Engineers Expand

COMMENTARIES
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER WETLAND AREAS: THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS EXPANDS ITS JURISDICTION*
INTRODUCTION

In 1972 the increasing awareness of and concern for the effects of water
pollution on the quality of the environment and the recognition of the
inadequacies of past and existing legislation resulted in the congressional
enactment of amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA).t The goal of the 1972 amendments is "to restore and maintain
2
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" by
eliminating "the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters . . . by
1985." An interim goal is to achieve a standard of water quality that provides
for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and is safe
for human recreation by 1983. 4 Under the FWPCA it is illegal to discharge
any pollutant into the waters of the United States without a permit; 5
responsibility for overseeing the permit system is delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).6 Recognizing that the actual destruction
or removal of a waterway could be as environmentally disruptive as the
polluting of an extant waterway, 7 Congress integrated control over dredging
OEDrroit's NoT: This commentary received the University of Florida Law Review Alumnt
Association Commentary Award as the outstanding commentary submitted during the

fall 1975 quarter.
1. Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500 §§101 et seq., 86 Stat. 816, amending 33
U.S.C. §§1151 et seq. (1970) (codified at 33 US.C. §§1251 et seq. (Supp. I, 1972)) [hereinafter
cited as FWPCA]. For a general history of the events leading up to the passage of the
1972 amendments, see Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement Under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 LAND & WATER L. REv. 369, 370-74 (1974); Note,
Clearing Muddy Waters: The Evolving Federalization of Water Pollution Control, 60
GEo. L.J. 742, 744-61 (1972); Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 1973 WIs. L. REv. 893, 893-95.
2. FWPCA §101(a), 33 U.S.C. §1251(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
3. Id. §1251(a)(1).
4. Id. §1251(a)(2).
5. FWPCA §§301(a), 402, 33 U.S.C. §§1311(a), 1342 (Supp. H, 1972). In some instances
an actual permit may not be required, but approval of the EPA is required. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. §1328 (Supp. H, 1972).
6. FWPCA §§301(a), 402, 33 U.S.C. §§1311(a), 1342 (Supp. II, 1972). Generally, permits
are issued only for discharges that comply with technology based effluent limits and water
quality standards. Specifically, permits are issued for discharges from point sources. A
point source is "any discernible . . . conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may
be discharged." FWPCA §502(14), 33 U.S.C. §1362(14) (Supp. II, 1972). An effluent
limitation is a restriction applying to a particular point source that limits the "quantities,
rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which
are discharged." Id. §1362(11). The effluent limitations are set by the EPA based on the
availability and practicality of current technological equipment for removing the pollutants
from waste water. 33 U.S.C. §1314(b) (Supp. U1, 1972).
7. FWPCA §404(c), 33 U.S.C. §1344(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
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and filling activities into the scope and purpose of the act. 8 Authority to
administer the permit system controlling these activities was given to the
United States Army Corps of Engineers.9
Congress clearly intended that the scope of the new act should be national
and that federal regulation should reach areas previously untouched by
federal control.10 Although the FWPCA contains a provision that the act
is to apply only to navigable waters, the latter term is broadly defined as the
"waters of the United States."' 1 During the House debate on this bill,
Representative Dingell stated that the term navigable waters was to be
defined as "the waters of the United States" in a geographical sense, and was
not to be limited to "navigable waters of the United States" in the technical
sense as it had appeared in some prior laws. 12 He further elaborated by
stating that the "conferees fully intend that the term navigable waters be
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by
agency determinations which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes." 1 The exact scope of the jurisdictional definition was not detailed in the act, 14 which leaves the limits of the statute to evolve in the
courts. Although the EPA has not yet been sued for failure to recognize
the geographical jurisdiction that some commentators say was conferred by
the act, a federal court has ordered the Corps of Engineers to implement
5
its full jurisdictional mandate.1
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway,16 the federal district
8. Id. §1344.
9. Id. §1344(a).
10. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first passed in 1948. It was subsequently amended five times previous to the 1972 amendments because of its failure to
adequately stem the growing problem of water pollution. The original act proceeded
on the assumption that control of water pollution was the primary responsibility of the
states. Although the later amendments increased federal grants, introduced water quality
standards, and instituted more adequate enforcement provisions, these provisions achieved
few results. The 1972 amendments were, in effect, a complete rewriting of the past
law. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 1, at 370-74. After the 1972 amendments were passed, the
EPA was burdened with large administrative responsibilities. The EPA missed a number
of procedural deadlines, failed to quickly establish certain quality standards, and created
a number of exclusions to its permit program. Recently, it has been sued in order to
force it to correct these failings. Hall, Litigation Under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL L. Rra. 50,109, 50,115-16 (1974). One
commentator has attributed these failures in part to the fact that the funding of the
EPA has been inadequate for it to function optimally. Speth, Environmental Critique
(The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Problems and Prospects After One
Year), 7 NATURAL REsOURCES LAw. 249, 253-54 (1954).
11. FWPCA §502(7), 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972).
12. 118 CONG. REC. 33,756 (1972).
13. Id. at 33,757.
14. See, e.g., Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,
77 DICK. L. REV. 459, 461 (1973) (recognizing that it was the intention of Congress to
greatly expand the jurisdiction of the EPA but questioning the propriety of this action);
Robie, State Viewpoint: (The Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the States: Love
in Bloom or Marriage on the Rocks), 7 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 231, 232-33 (1974).
15. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
16. Id.
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court for the District of Columbia held that the Corps had ignored the
statutory definition of navigable waters in section 502(7) of the FWPCA.17
Noting that the act defines navigable waters as "the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas," the court held that this language
demonstrated congressional intent to assert federal jurisdiction over the
nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the commerce
clause of the Constitution. s The court found that the Corps had acted unlawfully and in derogation of its responsibilities under section 404 of the FWPCA
by adopting a more limited definition of navigability, and the court ordered
the Corps to publish new regulations dearly recognizing the full regulatory
mandate of the FWPCA.19 Although the decision was written in language
suggesting that the Corps had failed to accept a clearly delineated
responsibility, the court ordered the Corps, in effect, to traverse previously
uncharted ground. In fact, the full extent of the jurisdiction granted to
Congress under the commerce clause has not been determined. 20 Since the
use of the Corps of Engineers as a watchdog and protector of the environment is of recent origin, its ability in this role is largely untested.
NAvIGAILITY AND THE HISTORY OF THE CoRps' PERMIT GRANTING AuTHoRITY

Prior to the passage of the FWPCA, the Corps of Engineers had administered a permit issuing system regulating certain dredge and fill activities
by the authority of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.21 This
act prohibits the building of any structure (dams, dikes, bridges) in or over
any navigable water of the United States and the excavation, filling, or
modifying of any lake or channel of any navigable waters without a permit
issued by the Corps of Engineers. 2 The jurisdiction of this act was essentially
based on the necessity of maintaining the navigability of the nation's waterways. 23 Historically the Corps' jurisdiction was limited to those waterways
that were navigable in fact - capable of being used for any sort of commercial
activity.24 Once a determination of navigability was made it could not be
extinguished by a subsequent finding that the waterway was no longer actually
17. FWPCA §502(7), 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) (Supp. I, 1972).
18.
1975).
19.
20.
21.

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686

(D.D.C.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 87-97 infra."
33 U..C. §403 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, §10,

30 Stat. 1151).
22.

Id.

23. See Eames, The Refuse Act of 1889: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water
Pollution, 58 CAL. L. Rlv. 1444 (1970).
24. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). "[Waters are] navigable in
fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water." Id. In some cases the fact that hunters
and trappers used a stream as part of their commercial activity was "sufficient to establish
it as navigable water.". Donley, Moss, Outen, & Speth, Land Use Controls Under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Citizen's Guide, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. RRm.
50,092, 50,099 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Donley].
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navigable. 25 Later court decisions enlarged the scope of navigability for federal
jurisdictional purposes to include waters that, though not commercially used,
had the capability of such use 26 and waters that, by means of "reasonable"
improvements, could be so used.2 7 Federal jurisdiction based on navigability
also extends to regulating obstructions in nonnavigable tributaries of navigable
waters if the obstructions could affect the navigability of the downstream
water. 28 Even though these findings seem to broaden the definition of
navigability, the Corps of Engineers has traditionally limited its jurisdiction
to those waterways navigable in fact, which has excluded, in most instances,
tributaries and feeder streams of navigable waters and tidal areas above the
mean high tide line.29
As long as the Corps' concern was to protect and enhance the navigability
of the nation's waterways, the historical definition of navigability created
no difficulties. Increasing federal concern with environmental protection
in the late 1960's led to an expansion of the Corps' permit granting authority
under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (commonly called
the Refuse Act).3s Pursuant to an executive order issued in December 1970,
the Corps was required to implement a permit program to regulate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States or their
tributaries.31 The change in the focus of the act from control of navigational
impediments to restriction of pollutant discharge necessitated an expansion
of the definition of navigable waters to include waterways that were being
polluted but were not necessarily navigable in fact.2 2 The Corps of Engineers
and the EPA began initial steps toward the institution of a permit system for
the industrial discharge of pollutants, but a federal district court's ruling
halted this program. In Kalur v. Resor,33 the court held that the 1899 act
gave authority for a permit system to cover discharges only into navigable
waters and that the Corps had no authority to issue or deny permits
authorizing discharge into the tributaries of navigable waters.3 4 The court
also ruled that the Corps could issue no permit in cases involving navigable
25.
26.
27.
28.

See
See
See
See

Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).

29. Donley, supra note 24, at 50,099. Traditionally the area above the mean high
water (tide) line (mean higher high water line on the Pacific coast) was considered to be land

and below this mark was considered to be water. Both coasts of the United States experience two high tides daily, one of which rises higher on the shore than the other.
"The mean high water line (MHW) is the average of both high tides over a period of
19 years; the mean higher high water line (MHHW) is the average of only the higher

of the two high tides for same period of time." Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL
L. RnTR. 20,039, 20,041 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
30. 33 U.S.C. §407 (1970). Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act is usually
called the Refuse Act, but at times the name has been applied to the entire 1899 Act.
31. Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970).
32. See Comment, Discharging New Wine Into Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. PIr. L. REv. 483 (1972).
33. 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
34. Id. at 11-12.
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waters unless it submitted an environmental impact statement for each proposal.35 This ruling effectively suspended the entire permit granting system

then being developed.3s Because the Corps' role as watchdog of the environment through revitalization of the 1899 act was halted so soon after its
inception, no expansion of the term "navigability" developed, and the Corps'
3
performance as a protector of the environment could not be evaluated. 7
While retaining and expanding the permit issuing regulatory scheme of

the Refuse Act,38 the FWPCA has almost completely superseded this statute
as a means of pollution control, although the Refuse Act remains in effect.

Primary responsibility is given to the EPA; however, the act continues the
Corps' of Engineers jurisdiction over dredge and fill activities. 39 Implementing
its authority under the FWPCA, the Corps retained the definition of
navigability developed under the 'Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.40 The EPA,
however, adopted a broader definition of navigability that was challenged
in United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co. 41 This court, in-

terpreting the words "navigable waters" as used in the FWPCA, found that
Congress intended the broadest possible constitutional meaning. Because
the act defines this term as "waters of the United States," the court reasoned
that one simply substitutes "waters of the United States" for "navigable
waters" wherever the latter term appears in the act.42 Thus, Ashland held that
a nonnavigable tributary of a navigable waterway is within the definition
43
of "waters of the United States."
Considering the same issue, a federal district court in United States v.
Holland- concluded that Congress intended to go beyond the "navigability"
35. Id. at 13. The National Environmental Policy Act requires that all agencies
of the federal government file a detailed impact statement with every recommendation,
report, or proposal for legislation and with any other major action that significantly
affects the quality of the human environment. These statements must outline the environmental impact of the proposed policy, detail any adverse environmental effects that
cannot be avoided, and describe the alternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. §4321
et seq. (1970). Congress in passing the FWPCA exempted most of the proposed activities
under the act from the necessity of complying with the provisions of the NEPA. FWPCA
§511(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1371(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
36, See Wenner, Federal Water Pollution Control Statutes in Theory and Practice,
4 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 251, 258-61 (1974).
37. But see Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
The Fifth Circuit upheld the Corps' power under the 1899 Act to deny a dredge and fill
permit application based solely on ecological reasons.
38. FWPCA §402, 33 U.S.C. §1342 (Supp. II, 1972).
39. Id. §1344(a).
40. 33 C.F.R. 209, 260 (1975).
41. 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
42. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 364 F. Supp. 349, 350 (W.D. Ky.
1973).
43. Id. at 351.
44. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). For extensive analysis of this case and a
history of the prior judicial definitions of navigability, see Comment, Federal Jurisdiction:
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 Reach Polluting Activities Occurring
Above Mean High-Water Line, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 799 (1974); Comment, The 1972
Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Extends Dredge and Fill Jurisdic-

tion Above the Mean High Water Mark, 6

RuTGErs-CAMDEN
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limitation to control water pollution. The defendant in Holland had filled
man-made nonnavigable mosquito canals and mangrove wetlands above the
mean high water line. The court easily concluded that the canals were within
the scope of the FWPCA, seemingly because they emptied into a navigable
body of water,4 5 but congressional intent to control fill activities in the mangrove wetlands was less apparent. Reasoning that the FWPCA embraced the
belief that pollution of wetlands areas could prove ecologically fatal, the court
"necessarily" felt the act was intended to avoid such catastrophes. The court
seemed to conclude that the mangrove wetland area was land instead of
water but that "fill activities on land periodically inundated by tidal waters
constituted discharges entering 'waters of the United States.' "-46In passing
the FWPCA, Congress intended to reach the source of pollution, even if
this necessitated breaching the barrier of the mean high water mark, the
traditional boundary of navigable waters. 47 The Holland court did not define
"waters of the United States"; instead, it reasoned that the commerce clause
was the only limitation on the Corps' jurisdictional power.
The third recent decision to examine this issue was Leslie Salt Co. v.
Froehlke.4 The single question presented was whether the Corps' jurisdiction
extended above the mean high water mark. Relying on the reasoning of the
Ashland and Holland cases, the court concluded that to permit the Corps to
extend its regulation above the mean high water mark was a reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction under the FWPCA.49
The only other guideline available to the Corps in drafting its new
regulations was a legal memorandum by the EPA defining its jurisdiction
for purposes of implementing the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit program.50 The memorandum states that the EPA
will have jurisdiction not only over all navigable waters and their tributaries
but also over waters that. affect interstate commerce. 51
THE EXPANDED JURISDICTION AND NEW PROCEDURES

In compliance with the Callaway court order, the Corps of Engineers
issued a new statement of jurisdiction on July 25, 1975. 52 The definition of
Waters of the United States: Does Federal Control Inundate the Wetland, 26 U. FLA. L.

REv. 893 (1974).
45. 373 F. Supp. at 673.
46. Id. at 676.
47. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
48. 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. RTrm. 20,039 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
49. Id. at 20,040. The court was, in effect, holding that it was permissible to use the
mean higher high water mark as the boundary for navigable water on the Pacific coast.
The propriety of extending jurisdiction above this line was not explored. See note 29
supra.
50. See Current Development, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL Rpr. 1240 (Feb. 9, 1973).
51. Id. Specifically, jurisdiction was stated to include interstate and intrastate lakes,
rivers, and streams that are utilized by interstate travelers for recreational purposes, or
from which fish or shellfish are taken and sold in interstate commerce, or which are
utilized for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce.
52. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975).
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navigability adopted5 3 is broad, at least superficially. The Corps' regulationdelineates its jurisdiction under both the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
and section 404 of the FWPCA. For the 1899 act the regulations retain the
traditional definition of navigability -navigable in fact. 55
In contrast to this, as directed by the Callaway court, jurisdiction under
section 404 of the FWPCA parallels the policy guidelines published by the
EPA. The Corps, however, retains the distinction between navigable and
nonnavigable waterways in this definition. Navigable waters include waterways traditionally considered navigable in fact, both coastal and interior,
and artificially created channels and canals used for recreational or navigational purposes that are connected to other navigable waters.5 6 Jurisdiction
for both coastal and inland navigable waters extends shoreward to the mean
high water mark for tidal waters and to the head waters of rivers, lakes,
streams, and artificial waterbodies. Nonnavigable waters include tributaries
of navigable waters, interstate waters, and intrastate waters used in some
method that broadly affects interstate commerce.57 Jurisdiction of nonnavigable
waters extends landward to the ordinary high water mark and up to their
head waters.
This distinction between navigable and nonnavigable waterways is important in deciding which wetland areas58 will be regulated by the Corps.
Only those wetlands adjacent or contiguous to navigable waters are included
as "waters of the United States" and thus fall within the scope of the regulations.5 9 If by navigable waters, in the definition of wetlands, the Corps means
those waters that are navigable in fact, it would exclude from regulation a
large number of the wetland areas in the United States. On the other hand,
these wetland areas may not be excluded if the term navigable waters under
the wetland definition is given the broader meaning outlined in the rest
of the regulations.8 0 By extending its jurisdiction to encompass wetlands, the
Corps avoids the problem of deciding where the water stops and the land
begins.61 To ascertain that an area is a wetland, the Corps must find that
the area is periodically inundated and that specific vegetation requiring a
wetland environment grows and reproduces in the area. 62

53. The regulation discussed in this commentary is the "interim final regulation."
As of this date, no final regulation has been issued.
54. Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,322 (1975).
55. Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120-(d)(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,324 (1975).

56. Id. §§209.120-(d)(2)(i)(a), (c), (d).
57. Id. §§209.120-(d)(2)(i)(e), (f), (g).
58. Wetlands can be defined generally as the zone of land" that lies between dry land

and land that is permanently inundated. A wetland is land that contains much soil moisture
such as a marsh, estuary, swamp, or bog.

59. Id. §§209.120-(d)(2)(i)(b), (h).
60. Id. §209.120-(d)(2)(i).
61. Previously, the Corps would accept jurisdiction only over that portion of a wetland
that was inundated by the tide a specified number of times per year, that portion being
considered, in effect, part of the water. The new method simply attaches jurisdiction to
the wetland, without dividing it into land and water.
62. Corps of Engineers Reg. §§209.120-(d)(2)(i)(b), -(h), 40 Fed. 'Reg. 31,324 (1975).
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The new definition of "waters of the United States" contained in the
FWPCA enables the Corps of Engineers to protect water quality to the full
extent of the commerce clause. It extends federal regulation over the discharge of dredge and fill materials to many areas that have never been
subject to federal control for water quality protection purposes. 63
Three exceptions that the Corps has made to its broad statement of
jurisdiction should be noted. First, although section 404 prohibits the discharge of dredge and fill material into the waters of the United States without
a permit, the regulations specificially exempt discharge of dredge material
into the territorial seas.&l Perhaps this exception can be explained by the
fact that the Corps is one of the primary contractors for such operations and
hopes to exempt itself from the necessity of obtaining a permit. 65
Second, man-made canals used for drainage or sewage disposal are omitted
from the definition of navigable waters. No permit would seem necessary
for dredge and fill activities affecting them; 66 however, regulation of such
canals was clearly within the purview of the FWPCA by the Holland decision.67
The third exclusion allows, without a permit application, the construction
of small bulkheads that result in minimal discharges.68 Recently, a federal
court held that the EPA could not exempt from the regulation of the NPDES
permit program any point source sites of pollution discharges.6 The EPA had
allowed small discharges of a certain type to continue without a permit. The
Corps' attempt to utilize a similar distinction in its new regulations may be
invalid.
The new regulations provide that the Corps may make a case by case
determination of its possible jurisdiction over any waterway that does not fall
clearly within the regulations' definitions," The permit requirement gives
the Corps an opportunity to evaluate the possible harmful effects of the
proposed activity on the environment; however, if the case by case determination takes place after the activity has been completed, the Corps will be
unable to prevent environmental damage. The purpose of defining the
Corps' jurisdiction was to give the affected parties notice of the necessity

63. The new regulations would extend federal jurisdiction to include, for example, a
lake located entirely within a single state and used only for recreational purposes.
64. Corps of Engineers Reg. §120-(d)(2)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,324 (1975). Territorial sea
is defined as "that belt of the sea adjacent to the coast of a state, beyond its land
territory and its internal waters, over which the sovereignty of the state extends." S.
THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRrrORIAL SEAS 3 (1972). The Corps will
therefore exempt from regulation bodies of water that have always been subject to its
SCHWARTZTRAUBER,

jurisdiction for dredge and fill purposes.
65.

See Wenner, supra note 36, at 253 n.6.

66. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,321 (1975).
67. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
68. Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120-(e)(2)(iv), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,326 (1975).
69. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 38, 50 supra.
70. Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120-(d)(2)(i)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,325 (1975). The
regulation specifically refers to intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands as falling within this category.
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for obtaining a permit. This attempt to fill the gaps in the Corps' definition
of its jurisdiction seems to be an open invitation to litigation.7 t
The new definition of the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers extends
federal control into areas that were previously within the sole power of the
states. Despite this extension, the FWPCA does not purport to exclude the
states from participation in the important job of water pollution control.
Thus, the Corps in its explanatory remarks accompanying the new regulations
stated that "there is considerable merit in having the states become directly
involved in the decisionmaking process to the maximum extent possible under
the law." 72 The states may become involved in the section 404 permit granting
system at two stages. First, before a permit can be granted, a state water
quality certification is required; no permit may be granted if the proposed
discharge would lower the quality of the receiving water below the standards
set by the state.73 If the state denies a water quality certification, the Corps
may not issue a permit. If the state does not have a certification program
or delays the processing of its certification, the Corps will proceed to process
the permit. Since the EPA must approve any state's proposed water quality
certification program before it begins operation/ 4 no danger exists that the
state standard will conflict with the objectives of the FWPCA. In the absence
of a state program, the EPA has developed its own standards.
A second type of state permit might be required. The Corps recognizes
that many states have existing permit programs that regulate the same types
of activities that are regulated by section 404 .75 In those states the Corps
may not issue a permit if the state denies an applicant a permit. If, however,
the state issues a permit, the Corps will not withhold its permit "unless there
are overriding national factors of the public interest which dictate such
action." 76 The Corps does not explain what these overriding factors would
be. Since there is no requirement that the state's permit program meet any
national environmental standards, it is possible that a state's approval of
a permit will not effectuate the purposes of the FWPCA. By according such
great weight to the state's determination of whether to grant a permit, the
Corps may be failing to comply with its statutory responsibility.
The new regulations bring the protection of wetland areas under federal
control for the first time. Wetlands protection involves unique factors not
present in attempts to control water pollution in other "navigable waters."7 7
71. See, e.g., United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1811 (D. Ariz. 1975).
(The FWPCA was attacked as being. void for vagueness, specifically because the general
definition of navigable waters contained in the act was said to be so vague that it failed
to give fair warning of the conduct that it made criminal. The court rejected this argument
as applied to the broad definition given in the act.) The Corps' failure, however, to
explicitly define every aspect of its jurisdiction may raise more serious problems of adequate
notice to affected parties.
72. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,322 (1975).
73. FWPCA §303, 33 U.S.C. §1313 (Supp. II, 1972).
74. Id. §1313(a). See also Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120-(f(3), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,327

(1975).
75.
76.
77.

40 Fed. Reg. 31,322 (1975).
Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120-(f)(e)(iii), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1975).
See, e.g., Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the, States, 5 LAND &.WATER
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The quality of the wetlands area is not a prime consideration; the real
issue is the continued existence of the wetlands area. Water pollution control
under the FWPCA has been predicated on setting standards either to maintain
or improve the existing quality of the polluted water. The enforcement
provisions of the FWPCA do not focus on the nondegradation of presently
pure water.7 8 As one commentator has noted: "While the importance of
nondegradation has been recognized on a policy level, it has not been effectively
implemented." 791 Nondegradation of presently pure water is analogous to
wetlands protection since the Corps will be trying to maintain the "purity"
of many wetland areas as well as trying to improve those already damaged.
In dealing with wetlands, the Corps, contemplating a balancing process,
has delineated in its regulations some of the factors to be considered. Its
decisions will weigh the benefits and probable impact of the proposed fill
activity against the need to preserve the wetland in its present state.8 0 The
Corps recognizes that wetlands serve important natural and biological functions such as aiding fish and wildlife reproduction, protection against erosion,
providing storage areas for storm and flood waters, and affording recharge
areas for surface and ground water. 8' While a particular alteration of a wetland may cause only minor damage, the cumulative effect of many small
changes often results in a major impairment of wetland resources.8 2 Against
these important environmental concerns the Corps plans to balance such
factors as the dredge and fill project's effect on the local economy, on
employment, and on navigation.8 3 Since the Corps' jurisdiction over the
wetlands is predicated on. the environmental concerns of the FWPCA, it is
questionable whether the proposed balancing process is compatible with the
Corps' responsibility. Furthermore, given the EPA's inactivity in implementing
its own nondegradation responsibility,84 it seems unlikely that the Corps
will assume a leading role in this area.
As a whole, this regulatory expansion of jurisdiction over dredge and fill
activities may catalyze the EPA's involvement in previously neglected areas
and may serve as the definitive statement of the EPA's jurisdiction over
waterways.
THE NEW REGULATIONS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The only obstacle to full implementation of the expanded jurisdiction
of the Corps and the EPA would be a judicial finding that such jurisdiction
L. REv. 351, 351-62 (1970); Comment, The 1972 Amendments to Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Extend Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction Above the Mean High Water Line,
6 RUTGEa-CAMDEN L.J. 823 (1975).
78. See Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Need for Effective Action,
50 Norm DAME LAW. 890, 896-900 (1975).
79. Id. at 890-91.
80. Corps of Engineers Reg. § §209.120-(f)(1), (2), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1975).
9
81. Corps of Engineers Reg. §20 .120-(g)(3), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,328 (1975).
82. Id. §209.120-(g)(3)(iii).
83. 33 C.F.R. §209.120-(g)(3)(iii).
84. See Note, supra note 78, at 896-97.
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has no constitutional basis. The legislative history of the FWPCA appears to
support a broad jurisdictional interpretation.8 5 Congress intended to establish
federal pre-eminence in the field of water pollution control because of the
widespread dissatisfaction with individual state efforts toward solving the
problem. 6 Congress, in expanding its control over the "waters of the United
87
States," relied on its constitutional power under the commerce clause.
Although there appear to be some limits on the commerce power, most
recent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted this power broadly.88
The extent of congressional power over the nation's waterways has seldom
been reviewed because all previous federal acts extended regulation only
to those waters characterized as interstate or navigable.89 Thus, past federal
acts respected the general principle of a state's sovereignty over its own internal waters. In considering the precursors of the FWPCA, courts seemed
to assume that congressional power under the commerce clause was limited
to navigable waters. 90 As the EPA and the Corps began to implement the new
power given them under the FWPCA, several courts9 ' were faced squarely
with this new assertion of congressional commerce power. The Sixth Circuit
in Ashland 92 noted that Congress found uncontrolled pollution of the nation's
waterways a "threat to its interstate commerce."93 The court concluded that
congressional passage of the FWPCA based on this finding was indeed
constitutional.
Another lower federal court in United States v. Holland" agreed with the
Ashland court's finding of constitutionality. The Holland court justified this

finding by stating that: "It is beyond question that water pollution has a
serious effect on interstate commerce and that the Congress has the power

to regulate activities such as dredging and filling which cause such pollution."9 5 Stressing the lethal effects of pollutants on all organisms and the
85. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
86. See 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-58 to 3-59, 3-80-1 to 3-81 (1973).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
88. See generally Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard
v. Fillburn, 317 US. 111 (1942). But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465
(1976).
89. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. INus. & Com. L. REv. 672, 674-77.
90. Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v.
Republic Steel Corp, 362 US. 482 (1960); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F.
Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
91. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); P.F.Z.
Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975); United States v. Phelps Dodge
Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389
F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975); United States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. 1937 (E.D. Va. 1975); Weiszmanm v. Corps of Engineers, 7 E.R.C. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 5
ENVRONmENTAL L. Rpr. 20,039 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp.
665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
92. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
93. Id. at 1325.
94. 373 F.-Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
95. Id. at 673.
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interrelatedness of ecological systems, the court felt that it would be contrary to reason to hold that water pollution does not affect interstate commerce unless committed in navigable waters.9 6 The cases since Ashland and
Holland have concurred in finding that the FWPCA's grant of jurisdiction
9
is a valid exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause. 7
Federal pre-eminence in the regulation of the nation's waterways seems to be
firmly established.
Although there may be constitutional authority for the FWPCA's broad
jurisdiction, regulation of the waterways under this act, particularly in dredge
and fill operations, may amount to a taking of property. 98 If this regulation is
found to be a taking, the fifth amendment9 9 would require compensation.100
The experience of states that have passed wetlands protection acts indicates
that litigation over the taking issue is likely to be frequent.' 0'
IMPLEMENTING THE NEW REGULATONS

The effect of the Corps' of Engineers geographical and subject matter
jurisdiction is to make it an overseer of a federal wetlands act. 0 2 The FWPCA
and the Corps' new regulations for implementing its jurisdiction should
enable these valuable natural resources to be adequately protected; however,
the history of the Corps' activity in ecological areas raises serious doubts about
its ability to function in this new capacity. Traditionally, the Corps has been
an agressive builder and constructor,' 0 3 allegedly ignoring environmental interests unless there has been exhaustive proof of environmental damage.- °
The Corps' former dredge and fill regulations have been criticized as inadequate in that they interpreted the Corps' jurisdiction narrowly, permitted

96. Id.
97. P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975); United States
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975); United States v. Sexton Cove
Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975); United States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. 1937
(E.D. Va. 1975); Weiszmann v. Corp of Engineers, 7 E.R.C. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Leslie
Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. RvT. 20,039 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
98. See, e.g., Comment, Environmental Land-Use Control: Common Law and Statutory
Approaches, 28 U. Mi~mi L. REv. 135, 153-155 (1973).
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
100. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
101. For a history of Connecticut's experience with wetlands protection act, which
includes summaries of the experience of other states, see Comment, The Wetland Statutes:
Regulation or Taking, 5 CONN. L. REV. 64 (1972); Hall, The Inland Wetlands Act:
Reconciling a Collision of Interests, 48 CONN. B.J. 3 (1974).
102. Cf. Comment, The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Extend Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction Above the Mean High Water Mark, 6 RUTGERSCAMDEN L.J. 823, 840 (1975).
103. See generally Note, Corps of Engineers -New Guardians of Ecology, 31 LA. L. REv.
666 (1971); Comment, Protection of the Environment and the Army Corps of Engineers:
The Extent of Responsibility, 1971 LAW & SoC. ORDER 778.
104. See Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing a Citadel
Under Siege, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 19, 29-30 (1973).
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exceptions, "grandfathered in existing violations," and lacked tough enforcement procedures. 05
The problem of the Corps' narrow definition of its jurisdiction has been
remedied by a court order. 106 While the newly promulgated definition is
broad, there are reasons to believe that the Corps may be less than wholehearted in utilizing its new power. This reluctance was indicated when
the Corps published four alternative definitions for public comment prior
to adopting the new regulations.107 The Corps stated its preference for the
08
alternative that only slightly changed its old jurisdictional definition.
This public statement of its bias casts suspicion on the Corps' willingness
to aggressively implement its new power. Hopefully, since this alternative
was not accepted, the thinking that led to its proposal will not affect decisions
reached under the new regulations.
The Corps' new regulations provide for a step by step assertion of its
authority over areas not previously regulated.'09 Complete compliance with
the Callaway court order will not take place until July 1, 1977, two years
after the adoption of the new regulation. Since the court gave the Corps only
90 days to begin implementing its jurisdictional mandate,"0 the delayed
implementation is of questionable legality. The new regulations also exempt
all previous discharges (of dredge and fill material) completed by the date
of the issuance of the new regulations; : moreover, continued discharges
below a certain volume are excepted if started before the date of issuance of
the new regulation." 2 The Corps justifies these exceptions as being necessitated
by manpower and budgetary constraints."- While such considerations may
not be overlooked, the weight accorded them characterizes the maneuvering
that has followed the Corps' regulatory operation throughout its history."One of the positive improvements of the new regulations is the enforcement procedure. Under these provisions, when the Corps becomes aware
of any unauthorized activity still in progress, it must immediately issue a
cease and desist order."' Prior to the new regulations, remedial proceedings
105. Id. at 31.

106. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 592 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
107. 40 Fed. Reg. 19,767-68 (1975).

108. Id. at 19,768.
109. Corps of Engineers Reg. §§209.120-(e) (2)(i)(a), (b), (c), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,325-26
(1975). The new regulation immediately applied to all waterways previously considered
navigable and to contiguous wetlands; it applied to all tributaries of navigable waters and
lakes effective July 1, 1976; and on July 1, 1977, it will apply to all remaining waters within

the Corps' jurisdiction.
110. The Callaway court originally gave the Corps 15 days within which to publish
proposed regulations and 30 days to publish the final regulations implementing its full
jurisdictional mandate. Later these periods were amended to 40 days for the proposed
regulations and 40 days after that for the final version. Obviously, the court had meant
for action to be taken immediately. 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
111. Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120-(e)(2)(iii), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,326 (1975).

112. id.
113. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,321 (1975).
114. Hoyer, supra note 104, at 29-35.
115. Corps of Engineers Reg. §209.120-(g)(12)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,330 (1975).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

13

